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Private Nuisance: An Application
To Feedlots in a Rural Area
Botsch v. Leigh Land Co., 195 Neb. 509, 239 N.W.2d 481
(1976).
I. INTRODUCTION
In an unusual move, the Nebraska Supreme Court, after holding
that a feedlot in a rural area could be a nuisance, granted a request
for a rehearing in Botsch v. Leigh Land Co.1 After a hearing by
the full court,2 the former opinion was withdrawn. Though the
second opinion does not radically differ from the first,3 it is indica-
tive of how the Nebraska Supreme Court will apply the law of
nuisance to feedlots in rural areas, specifically to rural areas which
contain many cattle feeding operations.
Plaintiffs in Botsch owned and occupied a farm which included a
small livestock enterprise. Directly across the road from plaintiffs'
farmstead, defendant Land Company operated a feedlot which had
contained from 408 to 3,746 head of cattle. Runoff water and manure
drained through the length of the defendants' feedlot and through
an adjoining 1,100 head lot into four lagoons maintained by defend-
1. 195 Neb. 509, 239 N.W.2d 481 (1976).
2. The original opinion, reported at 195 Neb. 54, 236 N.W.2d 815 (1975),
was by a panel of four of the seven regular Nebraska Supreme Court
Judges, and retired District Court Judge Kuns. Judge McCown dis-
sented to the original opinion, and Chief Justice White concurred in
his dissent. The same two judges were the only dissenters to the opin-
ion substituted after the rehearing by the full court.
3. In general, the second opinion merely elaborated on the first and set
out the facts more explicitly. As defendants had not yet had an op-
portunity to present their evidence at the time the case was heard by
the Supreme Court, the second opinion makes it clear that defendants
may be able to rebut plaintiffs' evidence of a nuisance at that time.
Language in the original opinion may be read as holding that plain-
tiffs had conclusively established the existence of a nuisance rather
than merely a prima facie case. Irrespective of the intent of the first
opinion, the second makes it clear that plaintiffs' evidence was suffi-
cient to establish a prima facie case of nuisance, and nothing more.
As to the application of substantive nuisance law to feedlots, however,
there is no significant difference between the first and second opinions.
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ants. The lagoons were located directly across the road from plain-
tiffs' home. Plaintiffs complained of offensive odors, dust, and
insects originating on the defendants' premises and sought an
injunction, arguing that defendants' cattle feeding operation consti-
tuted a nuisance. After plaintiff had presented his evidence, the
trial court dismissed the action holding that, as a matter of law,
a nuisance did not exist. The Nebraska Supreme Court reversed
this finding and remanded the case for further proceedings. While
the decision in Botsch appears to be correct, the reasoning support-
ing the decision which was articulated in the opinion does little
to clarify what has been referred to as the most "impenetrable
jungle in the entire law,"'4 the meaning and scope of an action in
nuisance.
II. THE PRIVATE NUISANCE-PUBLIC
NUISANCE DISTINCTION
The majority in Botsch concluded that Nebraska statutes clearly
denominated defendants' cattle feeding operation a nuisance:
The Nebraska statutes make it clear that defendants' operation
constitutes a nuisance and the fact that the Department of Environ-
mental Control saw fit to ignore the air and insect pollution
features cannot excuse its maintenance. It may be noted that the
statutes do not distinguish between rural and urban areas. They
prohibit the generation of conditions injurious to the "health, com-
fort or property of individuals or the public." A rural home and
a rural family, within reason, is entitled to the same relative pro-
tection as others. The fact that the residence is in a rural area
requires an expectation that it will be subjected to normal rural
conditions but not to such excessive abuse as to destroy the ability
to live in and enjoy the home, or reduce the value of the neighbor-
ing property.5
Such a conclusion, while not incorrect, indicates that the court
failed to distinguish properly between public and private nuisance.
A private nuisance is a civil wrong based on a disturbance of rights
in land. A public nuisance is a criminal offense consisting of an
interference with the rights of the community at large.6
Nebraska does have a comprehensive nuisance statute.7 The
statute has been interpreted as making all common law nuisances
4. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 86 (4th ed. 1971).
5. 195 Neb. at 516, 239 N.W.2d at 486.
6. See, e.g., Mandell v. Pivnick, 20 Conn. Supp. 99, 125 A.2d 175 (Super.
Ct., Hartford County 1956).
7. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-1016 (Cum. Supp. 1974), which provides in
part:
Whoever shall erect, keep up or continue and maintain any
nuisance to the injury of any part of the citizens of this state
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crimes." In doing so, however, the common law action in private
nuisance was not obliterated or absorbed into the statutory law of
public nuisance. The Nebraska statute is primarily concerned with
the spread of disease, 9 that is, with public nuisance. A public
nuisance may, however, also be a private nuisance.' Therefore,
even if defendants' feeding activities violated the nuisance statute,
plaintiffs could still have a cause of action in private nuisance.
Clearly they did, because plaintiffs alleged a substantial interfer-
ence with their use and enjoyment of their own property. This
is not to say that plaintiffs could not also or alternatively have
sued under a public nuisance theory" by demonstrating injury
different in kind and degree from that suffered by the public at
large.1 2 Here, a substantial interference with the plaintiffs' use
and enjoyment of their land flowed from defendants' feeding activ-
ity, the source of any public nuisance as well. This interference
probably would be sufficient to confer a private right of action on
plaintiffs for any public nuisance caused by defendants' cattle feed-
ing operation. 13 The key is the substantial interference with plain-
shall be fined in any sum not exceeding five hundred dollars;
and the court shall, moreover, in case of conviction of such
offense, order every such nuisance to be abated or removed.
The erecting, continuing, using or maintaining of any building,
structure or other place for the exercise of any trade, employ-
ment, manufacture or other business which, by occasioning
noxious exhalations, noisome or offensive smells, becomes in-
jurious and dangerous to the health, comfort or property of
individuals or the public . . . , shall be deemed nuisances.
8. State v. DeWolfe, 67 Neb. 321, 93 N.W. 746 (1903).
9. NEB. REv. STAT. § 28-1016 (Cum. Supp. 1974), refers to offensive smells
that become "injurious and dangerous to the health, comfort or prop-
erty of individuals or the public" (emphasis added). This statute,
however, located in Chapter 28 (Crimes and Punishments), Article 10
(Offenses Against Public Health and Safety), Part (b) (Spread of
Disease), is concerned primarily with public health. It thus seems
that the law of public nuisance is not directly concerned with the right
of an individual to be free from substantial interference with the use
and enjoyment of his property, the basis of private nuisance.
10. See, e.g., Tedescki v. Berger, 150 Ala. 649, 43 So. 960 (1907).
11. Several cases indicate that a plaintiff may proceed under either a pub-
lic or private nuisance theory, or both, where both forms of nuisance
result from defendant's actions. See, e.g., Bishop Processing Co. v.
Davis, 213 Md. 465, 132 A.2d 445 (1957) (suit to enjoin operation of
a processing plant because of excessive odor); Tedescki v. Berger, 150
Ala. 649, 43 So. 960 (1907) (suit to enjoin operation of a brothel).
12. It is well settled that a private party cannot sue for the invasion of
a purely public right absent some showing that his injury differed
from that of the general public. See, e.g., Schroder v. City of Lincoln,
155 Neb. 599, 52 N.W.2d 808 (1952) (holding that a private party has
no right to complain of a bank's installation of a curb teller machine
on a city sidewalk).
13. Cf. Karpisek v. Cather & Sons Constr., Inc., 174 Neb. 234, 117 N.W.2d
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tiffs' use and enjoyment of their own property, 4 which, by defini-
tion, is a private nuisance and which is also the special injury neces-
sary to confer a private right of action for public nuisance. Plain-
tiffs in Botsch, however, apparently chose to proceed solely under
a private nuisance theory, complaining only of personal injury,
and not under a public nuisance theory where they would com-
plain of injury suffered by the public at large in addition to
their personal injury. Thus, a discussion of related Nebraska
statutes' -5 serves only to obfuscate the real issue of whether a
cause of action in private nuisance exists. Though a violation of
the public nuisance statute may be persuasive in arguing that a
private nuisance also occurred, it clearly does not conclusively
determine the existence of a private nuisance.16 Similarly, discus-
sion of whether the Department of Environmental Control should
have denominated defendants' activities a nuisance, while of some
interest in its own right,17 is plainly not germane to the particular
issue before the court.
322 (1962) (private party could sue to enjoin operation of an asphalt
plant although others in the community also suffered in varying de-
grees from the dust complained of); Morris v. Borough of Haledon, 24
N.J. Super. 171, 93 A.2d 781 (Super. Ct., App. Div. 1952) (plaintiff
allowed to sue for damages from noise and smoke where defendant
violated a zoning ordinance).
14. See note 22 and accompanying text infra.
15. See Botsch v. Leigh Land Co., 195 Neb. 509, 512, 239 N.W.2d 481, 484
(1976), wherein the court discussed Nebraska's criminal nuisance stat-
ute, NEB. RPv. STAT. § 28-1016 (Cum. Supp. 1974), and portions of the
Nebraska Environmental Protection Act, specifically NF. REV. STAT.
§§ 81-1501, -1506 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
16. The statutes are of value only as support for the proposition that of-
fensive odors can constitute an interference with use of property that
will merit judicial intervention. This proposition is well established,
however, in prior case law. See note 20 and accompanying text infra.
17. The majority opinion reveals that a representative of the Nebraska De-
partment of Environmental Control (DEC) had inspected the feedlot,
and had testified that the Department was not concerned with air or
insect pollution, and that defendants' feedlots did not pose a water pol-
lution problem. 195 Neb. at 511, 239 N.W.2d at 484. In dicta, the ma-
jority indicated that the DEC has a definite responsibility to prevent
air and land pollution in addition to water pollution. Id. at 512, 239
N.W.2d at 484.
The Nebraska Environmental Protection Act clearly charges the
DEC with a duty to prevent air, land, and water pollution. See NEB.
REV. STAT. § 81-1504(2), (5)-(7), (9), (13), (16)-(17), (20)-(22),
(24)-(25) (Cum. Supp. 1974). Another section of the Act provides
that failure to adhere to the air, water, or land quality standards
established by the DEC shall be considered a public nuisance. See
NEB. REV. STAT. § 81-1506 (1) (b) (Cum. Supp. 1974). Currently, how-
ever, the DEC's rules and regulations pertaining to feedlots contain
no reference to air pollution. See Neb. Dep't of Environmental Con-
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III. PRIMA FACIE NUISANCE
A private nuisance exists only if defendant's conduct works a
substantial interference with plaintiff's use and enjoyment of his
property.' 8 The Nebraska Supreme Court has long recognized
that the owner of the soil has a strong interest in the purity of
the air overlying it.19 Nevertheless, a certain amount of impurity
in the atmosphere is a necessary incident of modern life. As stated
by the Nebraska Supreme Court:
The right to have the air floating over one's premises free from
noxious and unnatural impurities is a right as absolute as the right
to the soil itself, although there are certain uses of property that
necessarily impart more or less impurity to the air which are
regarded as lawful when reasonably exercised, and must be sub-
mitted to as among the incidents of living in a town or thickly
settled districts .... A feeding yard is not necessarily a nuisance.20
Consequently, a nuisance exists only if the interference with plain-
tiff's use and enjoyment of his property is substantial, not
trol, Rules and Regulations Pertaining to Livestock Waste Control
(1975). Moreover, Rule 23 provides that compliance with the regu-
lations shall be prima facie evidence that a nuisance does not exist.
Rule 2, however, requires a construction permit for a feedlot if,
among other things, the feedlot would violate the Environmental
Protection Act or constitute a nuisance in the absence of waste con-
trols. Rule 24 provides for civil proceedings or injunctive relief for
failure to comply with the rules.
The question posed, then, is whether the DEC can, by ignoring air
pollution in its feedlot regulations, avoid finding a violation of the En-
vironmental Protection Act where defendant's conduct would be a
public nuisance under the air pollution provisions of Nebraska's crim-
inal nuisance statute, NEB. REv. STAT. § 28-1016 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
See note 7 supra. Alternatively, does, as the majority's dicta seem
to suggest, the Environmental Policy Act itself charge the DEC with
the duty of enforcement in such circumstances even though there are
no directly applicable regulations? One could argue that the basic act
requires regulations that would apply to such situations. Especially
disconcerting, however, is the possibility, though remote, that the DEC
could make it more difficult to establish the existence of a public nui-
sance due t6 odors and dust from feedlots, by promulgating rules that
would make compliance with regulations that ignore air pollution
aspects of feedlot operation prima facie evidence that the feedlot is
not a nuisance. Though Botsch involved private rather than public
nuisance, and was, therefore, an inappropriate vehicle to decide ques-
tions relating to the DEC, the Nebraska Supreme Court will undoubt-
edly be called upon to clarify these matters at some future date.
18. See, e.g., Rogers v. Elliott, 146 Mass. 349, 15 N.E. 768 (1888) (ringing
of a church bell not a substantial interference despite its serious effect
on a hypersensitive individual).
19. Francisco v. Furry, 82 Neb. 754, 118 N.W. 1102 (1908).
20. Id. at 756, 118 N.W. at 1103.
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trifling.21 In Botsch, the testimony recounted in the majority
opinion clearly indicates that the interference alleged there was
substantial.22 Even the trial court, which held that as a matter
of law a nuisance did not exist, concluded that "plaintiffs were
subjected to intolerable odors and a substantial increase in flies due
to defendants' operation.
2 3
In reversing the trial court, the majority of the Nebraska
Supreme Court necessarily concluded that plaintiffs had stated a
prima facie case of nuisance. Judge McCowan, however, supporting
the trial court in his dissent, argued that evidence of intolerable
odors and a substantial increase in flies was not alone enough to
constitute a prima facie case of nuisance absent some showing that
the operator of the feedlot acted unreasonably. 24 Although Judge
McCown apparently and erroneously equated unreasonable use
with a showing that a feedlot could be operated in a manner that
would not produce odors and flies to the degree it constituted a
nuisance,25 the issue of whether or not unreasonable use is part
of a prima facie case merits some consideration.
Though reasonable use is an element of all private nuisance
suits, few cases have considered whether reasonable use is a matter
21. Thus, occasional unpleasant odors are not enough to establish a nui-
sance. Jones v. Adler, 183 Ala. 435, 62 So. 777 (1913) (odors from
a sewage purification plant); Thiel v. Cernin, 224 Ark. 854, 276 S.W.2d
677 (1955) (odor from a broiler house); Francisco v. Department of
Institutions & Agencies, 13 N.J. Misc. 663, 180 A. 843 (Ch. 1935) (hos-
pital odors from a private nursing home).
22. 195 Neb. at 511, 239 N.W.2d at 484. The opinion relates the facts as
follows:
Dust from feedlots frequently blew across to plaintiffs'
premises in considerable volume. Large numbers of flies
were attendant on the feeding operations and infected plain-
tiffs' premises in large numbers. Odors originating in the
ponds were very obnoxious and continuously present. One
witness described the odor as a stagnant smell and stated he
would not live next door to it. Another said the smell was
"pretty stout," might make people sick, and that he could not
stand it all the time. Another said the odor penetrated cloth-
ing and with the flies made it impossible for the plaintiffs
to enjoy their lawn. Another said she found the smell "atro-
cious" and closed her car windows when passing by. Another
said that the condition was such that he would not live on
the plaintiffs' farm. Another neighbor said that on one occa-
sion the smell was so bad that he and his wife left their home
temporarily. Another said the smell was worse than from a
dead animal and the flies were bad, so that he would not live
on plaintiffs' farm. Another described it as a "dead sour
smell" that "almost kills you."
Id.
23. Id. at 512, 239 N.W.2d at 484.
24. Id. at 517-18, 239 N.W.2d at 487.
25. See note 40 and accompanying text infra.
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to be pleaded and proved by the plaintiff, or a matter of defense.
Of those that have considered the question, some hold unreason-
ableness to be an essential element of plaintiff's case,26 while
others hold that the interference is, prima facie, a nuisance, with
the burden of showing reasonable conduct resting on the defend-
ant.2 7  Prosser suggests that where a claim rests in negligence,
unreasonable conduct should be proved by the plaintiff, but where
the interference is intentional, the burden should be on defendant
to justify the invasion.28 The distinction drawn by Prosser seems
entirely proper. On the one hand, unreasonable conduct is neces-
sary to show breach of duty in a negligence suit.29 Conversely,
the intentional torts require only that defendant know with sub-
stanial certainty that harm will follow his act;30 no overt refer-
ence to reasonableness is required.
31
If reasonable use of land is a matter of defense where a nuisance
is intentional, but unreasonable use of land is an essential element
of plaintiff's case where the nuisance is grounded in negligence, an
appraisal of the correctness of the Botsch decision depends on the
nature of the conduct underlying the alleged nuisance. It is first
necessary to distinguish between the interests invaded and the
nature of the invasion. The former determines whether the inter-
ference complained of properly can be called a nuisance.32 The
latter characterizes the acts underlying the nuisance as intentional,
negligent or appropriate for strict liability.33 Because a feedlot
operated in a rural area plainly is not subject to strict liability for
odor and dust, the question in Botsch is whether the invasion com-
plained of was intentional or negligent.
The trial court specifically held that there was a failure to prove
negligent operation of the feedlot 34 and the majority seemed to
26. Canfield v. Quayle, 170 Misc. 621, 10 N.Y.S.2d 781 (Sup. Ct., Herkimer
County 1939); Pawlowicz v. American Locomotive Co., 90 Misc. 450,
154 N.Y.S. 768 (Sup. Ct., Schenectady Trial T. 1915); Vestal v. Gulf
Oil Corp., 149 Tex. 487, 235 S.W.2d 440 (1951).
27. Ohio Oil Co. v. Westfall, 43 Ind. App. 661, 88 N.E. 354 (1909); Sexton
v. Youngkau, 202 Ky. 256, 259 S.W. 335 (1924).
28. W. PROSSER, supra note 4, § 87, at 581 n.6.
29. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 282 (1965).
30. See, e.g., Garratt v. Daily, 49 Wash. 2d 499, 304 P.2d 681 (1956).
31. There is, of course, an element of unreasonableness in the intentional
torts as well. If a person acts when he is substantially certain that
harm will follow, he acts unreasonably. Nevertheless, unreasonable-
ness need not be further established once the requisite intent is shown.
32. See note 6 and accompanying text supra.
33. Taylor v. City of Cincinnati, 143 Ohio St. 426, 55 N.E.2d 924 (1944);
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, Scope and Introduction to Chapter 40, at 220
(1939).
34. 195 Neb. at 512, 239 N.W.2d at 484.
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concede this point.3 " Apparently then, the invasion was inten-
tional, at least in the sense that defendants created and continued
the condition causing the nuisance with full knowledge that the
plaintiffs would be subjected to flies, dust and odors. 6 Further-
more, even assuming that the original underlying act could have
been negligent as would have been the case if the odor and dust
problem resulted from improper operation and maintenance of the
feedlot, in failing to abate the nuisance once they became aware
of it, defendants' acts would clearly become intentional.
Because the interference in Botsch was intentional, plaintiffs
should not be required to demonstrate that defendants used their
property unreasonably to state a prima facie case of nuisance.
While the holding in Botsch is consistent with this construction of
prima facie nuisance, the actual reasoning of the court was not
articulated clearly in the opinion. The majority opinion merely
states that "[p]rima facie, the existence of the conditions revealed
by the record . . . clearly establishes that defendants' feeding ac-
tivities, as operated, constituted a nuisance. '37  The preferable
interpretation of this language is that unreasonable use is not a
part of plaintiffs' case. Alternatively, however, the majority may
have determined that a showing of unreasonable use was necessary
but that plaintiffs' evidence was sufficient to show that defendant
was using his property unreasonably.
The definition of unreasonable use is of critical importance if
unreasonableness is a necessary part of plaintiffs' case. In his
dissent in Botsch, Judge McCown apparently equated unreason-
ableness with a showing that the feedlot could be operated in a
manner which would not produce excessive odors and flies."" In
other words, he equated unreasonable use of defendants' property
with a showing of negligence in their operation of the feedlot. If
defendants' use was unreasonable only on a showing of negligence,
Judge McCown's dissent would be well taken. As recognized by
the majority, however, such is not the law. 9 The Restatement of
Torts articulates the reasonableness standard as follows:
35. See Botsch v. Leigh Land Co., 195 Neb. 54, 58, 236 N.W.2d 815, 818
(1975) (McCown, J., dissenting).
36. See note 30 and accompanying text supra.
37. 195 Neb. at 514, 239 N.W.2d at 485.
38. Id. at 518, 239 N.W.2d at 487.
39. Id. at 512, 239 N.W.2d at 484. The court stated:
The trial court found that as a matter of law a nuisance
did not exist and appears to have based that finding on the
theory that plaintiffs had to prove a negligent or improper op-
eration of the feedlot. This conception of the law is erroneous.
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It is an--obvious truth that each individual in a community must
put up with a certain amount of annoyance, inconvenience and
interference, and must take a certain amount of risk in order that
all may get on together. The very existence of organized society
depends upon the principle of "give and take, live and let live," and
therefore the law of torts does not attempt to impose liability or
shift the loss in every case where one person's conduct has some
detrimental effect on another. Liability is imposed only in those
cases where the harm or risk to one is greater than he ought to
be required to bear under the circumstances, at least without
compensation.
40
The key is in the final sentence. Unreasonable conduct is conduct
that subjects a plaintiff to a risk of harm greater than he should
be required to bear under the circumstances. Where there is con-
flict, a balance must be struck between each person's interest in
using his own property as he sees fit. Conduct is unreasonable if
the burden placed on plaintiff is disproportionate to the benefit
derived by the defendant. Reasonableness of use depends on each
party's respective burden, not on the character of the underlying
conduct. As the majority correctly stated, the "exercise of due
care by the owner of a business in its operation is not a defense
to an action to enjoin its operation as a nuisance."
'4 1
Despite the majority's seeming insistence that proof of negligent
or improper conduct is not necessary for a finding of prima facie
nuisance, the following language also appears in the opinion:
"When a lawful business is operated in such a manner as to become
a nuisance it is operated improperly. Proof of the existence of a
nuisance establishes that the business has been operated negligently
or improperly."4 2 At first glance there appears to be a non
sequitur in the court's reasoning. Upon closer examination, how-
ever, it becomes apparent that the language quoted above is not
inconsistent with the holding in the case. The existence of a
nuisance does not depend on an ability to characterize independ-
ently defendants' acts as negligent or improper. On the other hand,
a showing that defendants' interference with the use and enjoyment
of plaintiffs' property was substantial implies that the conduct, if
not negligent, was at least improper in the sense that it is improper
to cause a nuisance. Thus, a finding of substantial interference
with plaintiffs' rights implies improper conduct but it is not neces-
sary to show that defendants' conduct is improper in any sense
other than as the cause of the interference. Consequently, if the
40. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § S22, Comment j (1939).
41. 195 Neb. at 514, 239 N.W.2d at 485, citing Sarraillon v. Stevenson, 153
Neb. 182, 43 N.W.2d 509 (1950), and 58 Am. JuR. 2d Nuisances § 34,
at 597 (1971).
42. 195 Neb. at 513-14, 239 N.W.2d at 485.
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majority indeed considers unreasonableness to be an essential part
of plaintiffs' prima facie case, it follows that they must infer such
unreasonableness from the existence of a substantial interference
with plaintiffs' use and enjoyment of their property rather than
from an overt characterization of defendants' acts.
It makes little difference, then, whether one states that reason-
able use is a matter of defense or that unreasonable use is an
essential element of plaintiffs' prima facie case, but that such
unreasonable or improper conduct is implied from the substantial
nature of the interference. In either case, the burden of establishing
reasonableness is shifted to the defense.43 To avoid needless con-
fusion, however, and to clarify the distinction between the interests
invaded and the character of the underlying conduct, the court
should use the following procedure to determine whether a prima
facie case of nuisance exists. First, is the interest invaded one
cognizable under the law of nuisance, that is, is there an interfer-
ence with a plaintiff's use and enjoyment of his land? Second, is
the interference complained of substantial, not trifling? If the
interference is substantial, how does one characterize the nature
of the underlying conduct, as intentional or negligent? If the inter-
ference is grounded in negligence, plaintiff must further demon-
strate that defendant's conduct was unreasonable to state a prima
facie case. If, however, the nature of defendant's conduct was
intentional, a prima facie case has been stated and defendant should
be required to proceed with his defense. Such a procedure is
consistent with the court's actual holding in Botsch.
IV. DEFENSE AFTER PLAINTIFF STATES
HIS PRIMA FACIE CASE
The majority opinion gave scant attention to the manner in
which defendants could rebut plaintiffs' prima facie case.44 It is
well established that fouling the atmosphere can be a source of
nuisance. 45  Likewise, while defendants will have an opportu-
nity to offer conflicting evidence, the substantial character of the
interference was strongly supported by plaintiffs' evidence.40
Consequently, the only element of a private nuisance cause of
43. If unreasonableness is not a necessary part of plaintiff's prima facie
case, it is clearly a matter for the defense. Similarly, if unreasonable-
ness is implied in the substantial nature of the interference that must
be proved as part of a prima facie case, reasonableness remains a mat-
ter for the defense.
44. 195 Neb. at 517, 239 N.W.2d at 487.
45. See note 19 and accompanying text supra.
46. See note 22 supra.
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action open to serious dispute is the reasonableness of defendants'
conduct under the circumstances. The issue, as stated by the
dissent, is whether a feedlot in a rural area could be enjoined as
a result of odors, flies, and dust emanating from the feedlot even
if it were demonstrated by defendants that there was no way to
operate the feedlot without such odors, dust, and flies.4 While
the majority clearly stated that feeding cattle is not per se a
nuisance,48 the implication of their decision is that a feedlot can
be improperly located even in a rural area such that feeding cattle
can give rise to an actionable nuisance.
It is well settled that an industry cannot be conducted in all
places and at all times merely because it is lawful. As stated in
Sarraillon v. Stevenson,49 a suit to enjoin operation of a small
slaughterhouse:
It has not heretofore been considered that a property owner had
a vested right in or a constitutional privilege to maintain or con-
tinue a nuisance .... An industry of this sort may not be con-
ducted at any place or at all places merely because it is legitimate
and lawful. The selection of a place of business is not necessarily
left to the owner alone. That subject is often a matter of both
private and public concern.50
It is equally well settled, however, that "rural residents must expect
to bear with farm and livestock conditions normally found in the
area where they reside."'" The ultimate question is whether the
interference complained of is of a type and degree that one would
expect to find in a particular locality at a given point in time.5"
If it is, then defendants' conduct under the circumstances is reason-
able, and there is no nuisance. If, on the other hand, the interfer-
ence complained of is not of a kind or degree that one would expect
to find in that locality, reasonable use should not be a valid defense.
In Botsch, defendants' feedlot was located in the worst possible
location vis-A-vis plaintiffs' farmstead. The feedlot and lagoons
were located directly across the road from and to the south of plain-
tiffs' residence.":' In eastern Nebraska, the prevailing summer
winds are from a southerly direction.54 Furthermore, when lots
47. 195 Neb. at 518, 239 N.W.2d at 487.
48. Id. at 514, 239 N.W.2d at 485, citing City of Syracuse v. Farmers Ele-
vator, Inc., 182 Neb. 783, 157 N.W.2d 394 (1968), and Sarraillon v. Ste-
venson, 153 Neb. 182, 43 N.W.2d 509 (1950).
49. 153 Neb. 182, 43 N.W.2d 509 (1950).
50. Id. at 188, 43 N.W.2d at 485.
51. 195 Neb. at 514, 239 N.W.2d at 485.
52. St. Helen's Smelting Co. v. Tipping, 11 Eng. Rep. 642 (H.L. 1865).
53. 195 Neb. at 510-11, 239 N.W.2d at 483.
54. See ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF COM-
MERCE, SELECTED CLIMATIC MAPS OF THE UNITED STATES (1966).
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were operated at capacity, the lagoons complained of could collect
waste material from nearly 5,000 head of cattle.55 Thus, the loca-
tion of defendants' feedlot and lagoons tended to maximize the con-
flict between the parties. Under such circumstances, the location
of defendants' feedlot was improper and the feedlot constituted a
private nuisance irrespective of the degree of care used in operating
and maintaining the lot once it was constructed, and notwithstand-
ing the fact that the feedlot was located in a rural area. Although
only 300 head of cattle were being fed in defendants' lots,50 the ma-
jority correctly recognized that the potential for larger operations
remained and thus, the essential nature of the case did not change. "
Defendants, however, could have argued that if feeding cattle
in a rural area can be unreasonable conduct absent any showing
of negligence or improper conduct in the maintenance or operation
of the feedlot, then there is no place where large feedlots could
exist. Such an argument would be specious, in that large feedlots
can be located in rural areas provided they are located so as not
to constitute a nuisance. At a minimum this means not locating
large feedlots adjacent to neighboring residences. It also may mean
that feedlots which, by virtue of their size, have significant odor,
flies, and dust problems may be required to maintain a buffer zone
between their feedlot and adjoining property. Such a buffer zone
could be in the form of an actual fee interest in property or perhaps
in the form of foul air easements. While rural residents may never
be completely insulated from feedlot odor, the interference should
be reducible to a level where it is one of the expected incidents
of rural life.
A legal system which recognizes the nuisance potential of feed-
lots in rural areas would, of course, result in higher costs to large
cattle feeders than a system which immunized rural feedlots from
nuisance suits. Such a result is economically desirable. A basic
principle of economics is that those who receive the benefits of pro-
duction should be required to bear the full costs of that produc-
tion.58 To the extent that feedlots are immunized from nuisance
suits because of their rural location alone, feedlot neighbors in
effect subsidize the feedlot operation by bearing part of the costs
of production in the form of inconvenience, discomfort, and declin-
55. 195 Neb. at 510-11, 239 N.W.2d at 483. The lagoons drained the Land
Company's 3,750 head lot and an adjoining 1,100 head lot.
56. 195 Neb. 54, 59, 236 N.W.2d 815, 818 (1975).
57. 195 Neb. at 514, 239 N.W.2d at 485. Cf., e.g., Cumberland Torpedo Co.
v. Gaines, 201 Ky. 88, 255 S.W. 1046 (1923).
58. For a nontechnical discussion by a noted British economist of the the-
ory behind what are referred to as externalities, or spill-over effects
see E. MIsHAN, TECHNOLOGY AND GRowTH (1969).
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ing property value. Professor Coase notwithstanding,5 9 the conse-
quence of such a rule would be to skew the production of cattle
into larger lots than would be economically optimal. The Botsch
decision avoids such an uneconomic result by clearly rejecting the
notion that a feedlot operating in a rural area cannot be denomin-
ated a nuisance and enjoined.60 It is important to recognize that
the court does not thereby strike a balance against an adequate
supply of beef. Rather, it strikes a balance between competing
property interests such that adequate beef supplies will be pro-
duced without imposition of undue burdens on feedlot neighbors.
Finally, defendants in Botsch could have argued that they had
a prescriptive or grandfather right to feed cattle in their present
location. In dissenting to the first Botsch decision, Judge McCown
stated that cattle had been kept in the area used by defendants'
feedlots for approximately 90 years and that there were approxi-
mately 1100 head of cattle on feed there as early as 1946. Further,
two of the dams had been constructed more than 20 years prior
to trial with the other two added in 1969.61 The issue.before the
court, however, was whether plaintiff had stated a case of prima
facie nuisance. Such historical facts were, therefore, irrelevant
because a prima facie case of private nuisance depends solely on
the substantial nature of defendants' interference with the use and
enjoyment of plaintiffs' property, at least where the underlying
conduct was intentional.6 2 Nevertheless, priority of location may
have some relevance as an element of defense.
In general, however, there is no prescriptive right to maintain
a nuisance.63 Nor is there any grandfather right to continue a live-
stock operation in its present location." While this is especially
true when the character of the area changes as where a feedlot
is absorbed by an expanding municipality,6 5 the principle should
be equally applicable whenever a previously lawful activity be-
comes a nuisance. Nevertheless, priority of location may be of some
importance in deciding on an appropriate remedy. One should not,
for instance, be able to disregard the location of a preexisting feed-
lot when locating a farmstead and then seek to enjoin operation
59. See Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAW & EcoN. 1 (1960),
wherein Professor Coase argues that under certain highly restrictive
conditions, an optimal resource use pattern can develop through ex-
change, irrespective of how legal rights are initially assigned.
60. 195 Neb. at 514-15, 239 N.W.2d at 485-86.
61. 195 Neb. 54, 58-59, 236 N.W.2d 815, 818 (1975).
62. See Section III supra.
63. See note 50 and accompanying text supra
64. City of Lyons v. Betts, 184 Neb. 746, 171 N.W.2d 792 (1969).
65. See generally, e.g., id.
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of the feedlot in a court applying equity principles.6 6 Assuming
suitable alternative sites are available, a plaintiff should arguably
have some burden to locate his farmstead so as to minimize conflicts
with preexisting livestock operations. Evaluating priority of loca-
tion is, however, complicated by the fact that while small or moder-
ately sized livestock operations may be compatible with closely
adjoining farmsteads, a larger operation may not be. A farmstead
might be located near an existing small livestock operation without
conflict. A subsequent increase in the size of the feedlot may, how-
ever, cause it to become a nuisance. Thus, the historical perspec-
tive of priority in a location may be of less value to a court than
it might initially appear. Ultimately, such an inquiry is important
only as it relates to a plaintiff's role in the conflict, that is, did
the plaintiff increase or mitigate his damages by his own conduct.
In any event, while priority of location ultimately may be useful
in resolving the Botsch conflict, particularly as it relates to the
choice of remedies if a nuisance is ultimately found, clearly such
an historical perspective does not bear on the substantive question
of whether or not a nuisance exists.
V. CONCLUSION
In Botsch, the Nebraska Supreme Court correctly held that
evidence of odors, dust, and flies from a feedlot is sufficient to
constitute a prima facie case of nuisance where the evidence indi-
cated that there was a substantial interference with plaintiffs' use
and enjoyment of their property. Unfortunately, the opinion did
little to clarify the confusing area of private nuisance law. In fact,
much of the opinion adds to the confusion currently surrounding
the distinction between public and private nuisance. The holding
of the court and much of the language of the opinion does indicate,
however, that the majority correctly perceived the nature of the
conflicting property interests. One can only hope that if the court
again is given the chance to rule on the Botsch facts after the dis-
trict court reaches a final decision on the merits, it will use the
opportunity to clarify the Nebraska law of private nuisance.
Norman W. Thorson '77
66. Cf. Carrol Springs Distilling Co. v. Schepfe, 111 Md. 420, 74 A. 828
(1909); Baltimore & S.P.R.R. v. Hackett, 87 Md. 224, 39 A. 510 (1898).
But cf. American Smelting & Refining Co. v. Riverside Dairy & Stock
Farm, 236 F. 510 (9th Cir. 1916) (not required to shut down business
where smelter smoke damages crops); Champa v. Washington Com-
pressed Gas Co., 146 Wash. 190, 262 P. 228 (1927) (not required to
move away from an operating gas plant).
